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Abstract 
Agrarian change in South Africa over the past two decades has seen consolidation of the 
hegemony of large-scale commercial farming and corporate agribusiness within agro-food 
systems. Constrained domestic demand and growth opportunities elsewhere have driven 
both farming and agribusiness capitals to move into other African countries, attempting to 
reproduce agro-food systems similarly centred on the dominance of large capital. This is 
evident in five areas: first, the financialization of agriculture and ‘farmland funds’; second, 
multinational and South African input supply industries; third, large-scale land deals to 
expand industrial farming systems; fourth, the export of South African companies’ food 
processing, manufacture, logistics and distribution operations; and fifth, the expanding 
reach of South African supermarkets and fast food chains. Regional expansion involves 
South African agrarian capital encountering substantial obstacles to entry, and challenges 
mounted by competitors in destination markets. Success as a regional hegemon in Africa’s 
agro-food system is thus far from assured, and even where it does appear to succeed, 
generates contradictions, and rising social tensions of the kinds experienced in South Africa 
itself. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Spurred by rapid deregulation and liberalization, the overall trajectory of agrarian 
change in South Africa over the past two decades has seen consolidation of the hegemony 
of large-scale commercial farming and corporate agribusiness within agricultural value 
chains. Ownership and control have become highly concentrated; high-tech and high-
input production systems are focused on lucrative new crops and markets; and 
employment continues to decline. In a context of constrained domestic demand due to 
high levels of unemployment and poverty and stagnating growth, and emerging 
opportunities for geographic diversification, both farming and agribusiness capitals are 
now expanding into African countries. Their strategies are premised on promoting and 
reproducing agro-food systems centred on the dominance of large capital. However, the 
support of host states, of the kind that facilitated the large-scale form of capitalist 
production and the growth of agribusiness companies in South Africa, is not assured, and 
success is thus far from certain. 
 
2 
 
Large-scale commercial farmers and agribusiness corporations have been expanding 
their operations into the wider region in recent years, but so have many other South African 
companies (Boche & Anseeuw, 2013; Hall, 2012). Such expansion is driven by calculations 
of potential profitability, but is also shaped by specific conditions. These arise from a 
combination of the inherited structure of the economy at the end of apartheid, neoliberal 
economic policies adopted by the post-apartheid government after 1994, and the 
slowing down of the global capitalist economy since the financial crisis of 2008/2009 
(Fine, 2008). But the strategies and modi operandi of South African companies were 
developed in a particular political economy context, and bear its imprint; when 
exported to other African countries, they tend to generate tensions reminiscent of those 
experienced in the domestic context. 
 
In this article we map out some of the structural foundations underpinning the regional 
expansion of South African capital, identifying key features of the domestic agro-food 
economy which condition the behaviour of regionalizing companies. This is evident in 
five arenas: first, the financialization of agriculture and the emergence of South African-
based ‘farmland funds’; second, the growing influence of multinational and South 
African input supply industries; third, the prevalence of large-scale land deals premised 
on investment in agro-industrial farming systems; fourth, the expansion of South 
African companies’ food processing, manufacture, logistics, and distribution 
operations; and fifth, the rapidly growing reach of South African supermarkets and fast 
food chains. In each arena, we identify key actors, noting their diverse expansion 
strategies and the contradictions they produce, including the ways in which these are 
circumscribed both by the character of local agro-food systems and by competition 
from other corporate investors in destination markets. 
 
South Africa’s regional expansion exemplifies a wider pattern of growing agricultural 
sector investment in regional and cross-regional agro-food systems by capitalist firms 
located in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries, and raises 
questions as to the similarities and differences among them (Scoones, Smalley, Hall, & 
Tsikata, 2014). Our focus in this article, however, is not with the BRICS organization per 
se, but rather with South Africa as one among several BRICS countries with growing 
influence in Africa’s changing agro-food system. South Africa is, of course, an outlier 
among the group, having by far the smallest economy of those within the grouping. Its 
inclusion among the BRICS was widely perceived as being due to its economically and 
politically dominant position in Africa – rather than being an emerging global power. 
Yet even within Africa, South Africa’s political and economic dominance is contested 
and increasingly in doubt (Radebe, 2016). Nonetheless South African companies are, 
together with others from within Africa and beyond, reshaping agro-food systems 
across parts of the continent in distinctive ways, albeit in a highly uneven and 
contradictory manner. 
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2. The political economy of post-apartheid South Africa 
Capitalist development in South Africa took off towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
following the ‘minerals revolution’ – the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, 
involving significant levels of foreign investment. Mining played a key role in driving 
urbanization and industrialization in the early twentieth century, and dominated export 
earnings for many decades, together with some agricultural products. Both mining and 
the (largely white) capitalist agriculture that it gave rise to depended on a low-wage 
regime. State policies in both the period of segregation following the consolidation a 
national polity (‘union’) in 1910 and in the apartheid era, from 1948 to 1994, focused in 
large part on ensuring a ready supply of cheap labour to these sectors (Marais, 2011). 
The first democratic government of 1994 faced the challenge of transforming the 
economy to make it more equitable as well as being able to sustain growth. Freedom was 
achieved at the very moment that the global economy began to move towards ever higher 
levels of interaction and integration amongst national economies, led by the advanced 
capitalist countries and the USA in particular. Trade liberalization in South Africa after 
1994 led to sharp increases in both export and imports, but globalization also brought 
many challenges, including those of intense competitive pressures from rapidly growing 
economies such as China. 
 
Crucially, the manufacturing sector has not succeeded in becoming more dynamic, job-
generating, and competitive in the post-apartheid era. The economy has shifted away 
from agriculture and levels and patterns of consumption have changed, but ‘poverty is 
declining slowly, inequality is extremely high, and production and trade patterns have not 
shifted from the relative predominance of raw materials, exports and the importation of 
high value added manufactures’ (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur, & Ncube, 2014, p. 13). The 
economic prospects of the majority of citizens have been only slightly improved, 
notwithstanding the growth of a new black middle class and an extensive system of social 
grants that provides some relief for the poor. 
 
Key features of the South African economy since the end of apartheid include the rapid 
expansion of services and government spending, and the continued relative decline of 
mining, manufacturing, and agriculture. Unemployment currently stands at around 27% 
when only active job seekers are counted, and at around 37% when those too 
discouraged to seek work are included. Many of those in employment, particularly in 
casual or temporary work, earn very low wages. More than half of the population is 
poor, and levels of inequality remain amongst the highest in the world, with a Gini 
coefficient that generally lies between 0.65 and 0.70 (Bhorat et al., 2014, p. 6). Poverty 
and inequality underlie severe social and political tensions, increasingly evident in 
relation to land, agriculture, and the agro-food system more broadly. 
 
3. Continuity and change in South Africa’s agro-food systems 
Capitalist agriculture in South Africa and its dynamics must be understood within the 
larger structure and functioning of the country’s political economy as a whole, as it has 
evolved over time, and its contradictions. South Africa’s mining industry in the nineteenth 
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and twentieth centuries was based on an authoritarian labour system designed to supply 
low-waged African migrant workers, as indicated above. These workers depended on 
food production by rural homesteads to supplement (i.e. subsidize) their wages, and were 
increasingly confined to densely populated ‘native reserves’, formed on the basis of large-
scale dispossession of African land (Wolpe, 1972). A capitalist agriculture based on white-
owned and generally large-scale farms emerged in response to rapidly growing markets in 
urban centres, and was strongly supported by the state, as well as by mining capital, for 
which cheap food formed a crucial ‘wage good’. An alliance of ‘gold and maize’ was thus 
formed, centred on the Highveld in the interior, where most grain crops were produced. 
The development of capitalist agriculture in South Africa did not promote 
industrialization, as elsewhere, rather the reverse was true. The transition from pre-
capitalist farming involved ‘accumulation from above’ on the basis of a ‘Prussian-like’ 
resolution of the agrarian question, as white land-owners, a key political constituency for 
Afrikaner nationalists, began to derive income from production rather than rent from 
African tenant farmers (Bernstein, 1996, p. 30). 
 
These features involved high levels of state subsidy and support, in the form of cheap credit, 
guaranteed markets, and administered prices through marketing boards, tariffs, and 
other forms of protection, income support, infrastructure provision, and research and 
extension (Vink & Rooyen, 2009). They were accompanied by continuing repression of 
black workers, lack of support for black farmers, and forced removals aimed at 
achieving a racially segregated countryside. The rise to power of the National Party in 
1948 and the adoption of apartheid as national policy saw intensified repression and 
adoption of measures such as the ‘pass laws’, aimed at heightened control of 
movement and settlement by the black majority. 
 
By the 1970s many decades of intensive support had yielded a (white) capitalist 
agricultural sector characterized by increasing capitalization and mechanization, soaring 
output, but also farming systems premised on low wages and, increasingly, high levels of 
debt. By the 1980s the economic and political crisis of the apartheid regime saw 
increasing political pressure exerted by mining and industrial capital to reduce state 
support to agriculture and allow freer rein to ‘market forces’ (Bernstein, 1996, p. 31). The 
deregulation and liberalization of agriculture were initiated then, but came to fruition 
only after the transition to democracy in 1994. 
 
Agricultural reforms since the transition have been largely detached from land reform, 
and have maintained their neoliberal character (Cousins, 2013). The concentration of 
ownership has proceeded apace, and by 2002 over half of all farm income was earned by 
5% of enterprises (Vink & Rooyen, 2009, p. 32). Farm employment has fallen steadily, 
and is increasingly casualized and seasonal in nature. The number of large-scale 
commercial units is currently estimated at under 35,000. In contrast, a minority of black 
rural families earn cash from regular sale of agricultural produce – perhaps as few as 8% 
of black rural households with access to land, or between 200,000 and 400,000 
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production units (Aliber, Maluleke, Manenzhe, Paradza, & Cousins, 2013). Many of 
these supply informal local markets. 
 
Post-1994 land reform policies aim to address the legacies of this bitter history of 
dispossession and discrimination through three mechanisms. A land restitution 
programme seeks to restore the land to black communities and individuals who were 
dispossessed in the period subsequent to the adoption of the Natives Land Act of 1913, 
which formally divided the entire country into race zones. The programme has 
experienced many problems, and has contributed little to reshaping ownership patterns in 
the countryside (Walker, Bohlin, Hall, & Kepe, 2010). Land redistribution aims to create a 
more equal distribution of land, but has slowed and instead of supporting black small- 
holders, in recent years has been diverted into tenuous forms of leasehold for a small 
grouping of aspirant black commercial farmers (Hall & Kepe, 2017). Tenure reforms were 
initiated to secure the legally vulnerable land rights of farmworkers and dwellers living 
on private farms as well as the ‘customary’ rights of people resident in the former 
reserves, now known as communal areas, but these show little evidence of success. The 
land tenure rights of the majority of black rural dwellers remain insecure (Cousins & Hall, 
2013). 
 
Ambitious land reform policies were adopted post-1994, but the ruling party has appeared 
to lack the political will required to tackle the complexities of the land question, 
displaying an enduring commitment to large-scale and commercial farming, despite 
rhetorical support for smallholder agriculture (Hall, Anseeuw, & Paradza, 2015). Over the 
past 22 years, funds for land reform have rarely constituted more than 0.5% of the 
national budget. The track record to date in delivering land and secure land rights to black 
South Africans is exceedingly poor, with only 8% of commercial farmland transferred 
(against a target of 30% by 2014), and many land reform projects performing badly in 
terms of production and the enhancement of rural livelihoods. Land reform is widely 
recognized as having failed to alter racially skewed inequalities in land holdings, and is 
thus a powerful symbol of the lack of substantive transformation in democratic South 
Africa (Cousins & Walker, 2015). The land is currently at the centre of fierce political 
contestation between and within political parties, and calls are being made to change the 
post-apartheid constitution to allow for expropriation of land without compensation. 
However, revelations of state capture by a politically well-connected family and their 
hangers-on are prompting anger at elite capture more widely (Bhorat et al., 2017). 
 
Deregulation, especially the closure of marketing boards and privatization of sectoral 
cooperatives, has facilitated vertical integration in the agro-food system, leading to ‘Big 
Food’ – the growing dominance of just a handful of powerful corporations – in inputs, 
processing and retail, and to a lesser degree in primary production. This was 
accompanied by increased financialization, the key moment in which was the creation 
of a futures market (SAFEX) in key staple commodities. While financialization is 
global, in South Africa it was clearly a response to falling rates of profit, underpinned by 
liberalization, and South African capital responding to a wider set of opportunities and 
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pressures in the global capitalist economy. The dismantling of the systems and 
institutions providing state support to agriculture has been accompanied by the growing 
power of agribusiness corporations, both upstream and downstream of farming. 
Concentration has increased still further since 1994, exacerbated by the entry of 
multinational seed, fertilizer and agrochemical companies (Bernstein, 2013, pp. 29–30). 
 
Contrary to the predictions of the World Bank, whose proposals for Rural Restructuring 
informed the deregulation plan of the 1990s, these policy reforms neither lowered 
barriers to entry for small farmers, nor lowered the price of food. Food price inflation 
over the past 15 years has far exceeded general inflation, not only due to widespread 
collusion in key sectors – notably fertilizer, seed, poultry, milling, bread, and retail – but 
due to the concentrated structure of the food system itself, and its industrial farming 
models premised on input- and capital-intensive production. The negative social 
outcomes of this economic structure have therefore become apparent and widely 
recognized. 
 
State responses do not confront agrarian capital in its various forms, but accommodate 
and even support it – despite the creation of a Competition Commission that 
investigates anti-competitive behaviour within a limited mandate. The ruling African 
National Congress has consistently supported large-scale commercial farming, 
confronting only those market ‘distortions’ brought about through cartel behaviour, 
rather than the fundamentals of the structure of the economy. However, given a 
growing crisis of social reproduction of ‘fragmented classes of labour’, only partially 
defused by social grants payments, capital-friendly policies such as these are increasingly 
coming under fire. In short, the contradictions of South Africa’s capitalist agro-food 
system are increasingly evident (Greenberg, 2017). 
 
4. The Increasing regional footprint of South African agrarian capital 
South African agrarian capital, in the form of both large-scale commercial farming 
operations and agribusiness firms that are active up- and down-stream of farming itself, 
is expanding across Africa (Boche & Anseeuw, 2013; Hall, 2011; Hall, 2012). Here we 
examine why and how this is taking place, and with what success. Table 1 lists companies 
located in different nodes of agricultural value chains, which are active in different 
African countries, many of which we discuss further below. 
 
Reforms to lower barriers to intra-regional trade have been key to the expansion of South 
African companies, giving them a competitive edge over some of their multinational 
competitors. The South African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Area of 
2008 set out a phased reduction in tariffs on intra-regional trade, facilitating more 
investment and cross-border sales of agricultural produce and foodstuffs. Expanded 
market access was provided from 2015 by the extension to a tri-partite free trade area, 
across the regional blocks of SADC, the East African Community and the Common 
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
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4.1. Financialization and farmland funds 
Along with deregulation of South African agriculture has come financialization, a feature 
currently being exported elsewhere in the region. Reflecting global trends (Fairbairn, 
2015) financialization has involved the emergence of South African-based agricultural 
investment funds (Boche & Anseeuw, 2013). Animating this is a growing cast of actors 
through whom transnational private capital is being brought into Africa’s agriculture, 
ranging from pension funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, banking 
institutions and agribusinesses and private equity funds. Among their financial 
instruments are ‘farmland funds’ offering share portfolios – essentially creating a new 
asset class. An influential European report on the ‘Vultures of Land Grabbing’ 
characterized such funds as ‘not only [having] a speculative business model, but also 
represent[ing] a conveyor belt for shareholder capitalism from the financial to the real 
economy’ (Merian Research and CRBM, 2010, p. 3).  
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Several such funds with regional and even pan-continental ambitions were established 
in South Africa from 2008 onwards, among them being Emergent Asset Management 
Ltd, a UK/SA management firm emerging from defence and high-tech industries in the 
US and now specializing in farmland investments in Africa. In the midst of global 
recession, its African Agricultural Investment Fund, established in 2008, aims to grow 
to €3 billion and promised its large institutional investors 30 percent annual returns. 
Partnering with Grainvest, one of the top 5 companies on South Africa’s SAFEX, it 
formed operating company Emvest Agricultural Corporation, providing a vehicle for 
South African, UK and other investors to diversify their investments into African 
agriculture in Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (McNellis, 2009, p. 13). Susan Payne, formerly of 
Goldman Sachs, initiated Emergent and formed the South African connection, punting 
African farmland as the most promising new investment frontier for institutional 
investors and wealthy individuals, arguing that ‘because of its series of microclimates, 
its highlands, its agricultural diversity and good logistics, South Africa and sub-Saharan 
Africa can deliver an enormous amount of food’ (Payne, cited in McNellis, 2009, p. 13). 
More ‘homegrown’ among the South African farmland funds is United Fruit Farmers 
and Agri Asset Management, part of investment and insurance company Old Mutual’s 
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African Agricultural Fund. This vehicle aims to take ‘advantage of Africa’s enormous 
untapped agricultural potential’ through twin funds – one for internal acquisitions 
through Futuregrowth Agri-Fund (SA) and the other being the African Agricultural 
Fund, enabling South African investors to channel investments both internally in the 
domestic market and externally in the region (UFF, 2015). Alongside these are several 
other funds, with a range of internal and regional foci including, among others, 
Phatisa’s African Agricultural Fund which by 2016 held equity in the region of half a 
billion US dollars (Anseeuw et al., 2012). 
 
Alongside these new financial actors are the more traditional forms of finance, both 
public and private. Among these are South African banks Standard Bank1 and ABSA, 
themselves transnationalized (Hall, 2011). From the agribusiness sector is Afgri, a 
privatized state-established farming cooperative, formerly Oos-Transvaal Beperk (OTK), 
which has, by absorbing other former state cooperatives, reinvented itself as a leading 
agribusiness in inputs, including through a continent-wide license to sell John Deere 
tractors, and is the main source of finance and logistics for several farmland 
investments, including the South African farming venture in Congo (Hall et al., 2015). 
It has, in turn, been absorbed by the Canadian company Fairfax which bought a 
controlling share in Afgri, despite protestations by the African Farmers’ Association of 
South Africa which objected that this once-parastatal was being sold off to a 
multinational rather than into black South African hands. 
 
Changes to financial regulation would incentivize investment from and via South 
Africa by creating ‘simpler rules’ to reduce the time and costs of doing business in 
Africa. By allowing holding companies exempt from the South African Reserve Bank’s 
exchange controls to be created by companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, as regional investment vehicles which would not be regarded as resident 
for exchange-control purposes. ‘Similar measures [would] apply to foreign 
companies wanting to invest in African countries using South Africa as their regional 
headquarters … as part of the Gateway to Africa reforms … , including BRIC countries’ 
(Gordhan, 2013, p. 12–13). 
 
Less significant by far is the direct role of state finance through development finance 
institutions (DFIs), primarily the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) with its 
massive infrastructure projects in road, rail, energy, and mining, and the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa, which has significantly increased its financing of regional 
projects in transport, energy, mining, ICT, health, financial services and 
manufacturing, primarily to Zambia, and Mozambique (Govender, 2013, pp. 10, 16). 
Meanwhile, the Agricultural Business Chamber has spearheaded studies on agricultural 
market opportunities in Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Kenya, providing advice to 
South African agribusinesses in support of their expansion plans (ABC, 2012). Clearly, 
faced with economic slowdown at home, capital is on the move out of South Africa but 
also globalized capital is on the move across Africa, in part via South Africa. This suggests 
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that a complex interplay of South African conditions, global trends and conditions in host 
states are combining to see agriculture become increasingly financialized, as new 
institutional actors cash in on African farmland as a new investment frontier. 
 
4.2. Inputs: seed, fertilizer and pesticides 
From an apartheid past where major agribusiness companies were state-owned, major 
seed, fertilizer and pesticide companies and cooperatives have been privatized, and 
several have reinvented themselves as regional players. The influence of multinational 
and South African input supply industries in Africa’s agro-food system has grown 
alongside their consolidation in seed, pesticide and fertilizer markets. One way in which 
this is happening is via multinational corporations buying up or into South African 
corporations and these in turn expanding in the region. Examples include Pannar 
Seeds (now largely owned by Du Pont), together with Monsanto and Pioneer Seeds, all 
but monopolizing the local market for maize, sorghum and wheat seed. 
 
One of South Africa’s seed giants, Pannar, was acquired by Du Pont’s Pioneer Hi-Bred in 
2013, effectively consolidating the domestic seed market in the hands of just two 
companies: Pioneer and Monsanto. This was initially prohibited by South Africa’s 
Competition Commission on the grounds that it would give Pioneer an anti-competitive 
advantage, a ruling that was confirmed by the Competition Tribunal but later 
overturned by the Competition Appeal Court (ACB, 2015, p. 25). The merged company 
and Monsanto together now hold 90% of the South African seed market for maize, 
wheat, and sorghum (Bernstein, 2013, 30). The merger, according to Pannar CEO 
Deon van Rooyen, would give the South African company access to the US company’s 
technology and research, and in turn offer it access to South African maize germplasm 
and a base from which Pioneer could ‘reach farmers it is not currently serving, such as 
those in some of the small-scale farming regions locally and elsewhere in Africa’ (cited in 
Coleman, 2012). Among these would be Pannar’s existing clients in other countries, 
where it holds significant market share in Zimbabwe (18%), Zambia (15%), and Tanzania 
(15%) (ACB, 2015, p. 25). 
 
As well as seed, in other sectors too, South African and multinational companies are 
leading the way in transforming the pesticide market, which is now dominated by 
global companies – Monsanto, Pioneer, Syngenta, and a few others, their entry into 
African agriculture facilitated in part by the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition. Further mega-mergers have been proposed, including ChemChina and 
Syngenta, DuPoint and Dow, and Monsanto and Bayer (Who Owns Whom, 2017a), 
with the latter being particularly contentious in South Africa where state approval for 
the merger is still pending. Despite there being some regulatory brakes, then, the 
pesticide market, like seed, is increasingly concentrated and multinationalized. Though 
Syngenta and Monsanto have direct market links into African countries – not 
necessarily using South Africa as a launching pad – there are many grain-trading joint 
ventures in the region that pair up South African companies with these multinationals. 
For instance, multinationals Cargill and Dreyfus are dominant grain traders in South 
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Africa, handling 70% of maize trade, and from there also expanding also elsewhere in the 
region (Greenberg, 2017). 
 
South Africa’s main chemical fertilizer companies, Sasol and Omnia, now operate as 
multinationals, and were found guilty – and fined – by South Africa’s Competition 
Commission in 2009 for cartel behaviour, together with the Norwegian-based Yara 
International. These companies, along with a small number of other multinationals, 
are the primary beneficiaries of subsidies under the rubric of the ‘Green Revolution in 
Africa’, funded by USAID and other donor agencies, including the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation (ACB, 2014). The G8’s New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition 
and the US’s Grow Africa initiative both involve policy concessions from priority countries 
to open their markets to such companies, as part of their ‘country cooperation 
frameworks’ which are required to unlock donor funds. South Africa’s Omnia, now in 
10 countries in Africa, has expanded in recent years but is dwarfed in this market 
already dominated by several global (and a few African) firms, mostly notably Yara, 
whose profits rose threefold on the back of global price increases between 2009 and 2012 
(ACB, 2014, p. 31). So even as South African input industries expand, they are, at times, 
in competition with larger actors from the global North, but at other times have 
agglomerated via mergers and acquisitions. By and large, we see the South African seed, 
pesticide, and fertilizer companies being consolidated as well as being acquired by multi- 
nationals, as they expand regionally. 
 
4.3. Land deals 
South African farmers and companies have been identified as among the ‘land grabbers’ 
in Africa, with land deals being premised on the expansion of South African industrial 
farming systems to new sites on the continent – but this story is complex and has 
changed over time (Hall, 2011; Hall et al., 2015). South African (white) farmers and 
farming companies have been on the move, securing substantial land deals across several 
countries – Mozambique, Zambia, and Congo being prime among them – while 
complaining of low profitability, high costs, and political threats to farmers at home. 
Africa has been at the centre of the ‘global land grabbing’ phenomenon from about 2008 
onwards, arising from the food price crisis of 2007/2008, the financial crisis of 2008 
and subsequent global recession, and fuel price spikes around the same time. While 
the reasons for the preponderance of large-scale corporate land deals in Africa are 
debated (Scoones et al., 2014), what is clear is that South African companies are 
significant among the range of actors involved. Deals are being struck typically between 
South African companies and foreign governments, sometimes with local business 
partners. They are not exclusively for food production or even for agriculture, as South 
African companies are now engaged in forestry deals in Mozambique and Ghana, in 
farming projects in Congo, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria, 
and in tourism (wildlife safaris and ecotourism) in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda 
(Matrix, 2015). These sit alongside general banking, financial services, telephony, 
construction, and information technology investments by South African firms. 
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Facilitating many of these deals is the commercial farmer association, Agri South Africa 
(AgriSA), which in 2013 created ‘AgriAllAfrica (AaA) as an external agricultural 
investment facilitation platform to enable South African farmers to invest more easily in 
farmland and agriculture elsewhere on the continent: 
 
South African farmers have started to spread their wings considerably wider than the 
traditional South [ern] (sic) African Development Community (SADC) … The 
international focus on agriculture’s potential in Africa has further intensified over the 
past year, with an increase in investments in various high-potential agricultural 
countries. (AgriSA Africa Policy Committee, 2014, p. 35) 
 
From the gung-ho plans to secure land concessions in 22 African countries in the 2011–
2012 period, AgriSA has, after disappointing results of its farmer groups ‘AgriSAMoz’ 
in Mozambique and ‘Congo Agriculture’ in Congo, withdrawn to more modest aims of 
consolidating its members’ operations through acquiring ‘priority status’ as agricultural 
investors in these countries, and engaging in talks with host governments to provide 
further protection and support. Neoliberal visions and post-colonial ambitions have 
foundered in practice, and the ‘land grab bubble’ has burst. Meanwhile, AgriSA has 
been pursuing new opportunities for land concessions in Ethiopia and Nigeria, while 
continuing to monitor conditions in countries where initial talks have been held, 
including Botswana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Angola, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, 
South Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt, Chad, Ghana, Gabon, and Sierra Leone (AgriSA Africa 
Policy Committee, 2014, p. 39). Meanwhile, at home, it is lobbying the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry for support in securing further sites in the face of South Africa’s 
discontinuation of bilateral investment treaties. 
 
AgriSA’s ‘Africa Policy Committee’ reports that ‘The international focus on agriculture’s 
potential in Africa has further intensified over the past year, with an increase in 
investments in various high-potential agricultural countries’ (AgriSA Africa Policy 
Committee, 2014, p. 35). In 2013, it created an investment platform named ‘AgriAllAfrica’ 
(AaA) to facilitate South African farmers’ deals in farmland and agriculture elsewhere on 
the continent, and brought state representatives from other African states on visits to 
South Africa to broker deals. Meanwhile, commercial farmers are forging stronger 
relations with regional farmer bodies, notably the Southern African Commercial 
Agricultural Union (SACAU) and the new continent-wide alliance of regional farmer 
organizations, the Pan African Farmers’ Organization (PAFO). Having already headed 
SACAU, AgriSA’s chief land deal negotiator, Theo de Jager, now heads both 
organizations, having been elected as president of PAFO in 2014, and has used his 
influence in the region and across the continent to promote commercial agriculture and 
increased uptake of technology, and regional integration through intra-African 
investment and trade (PAFO, 2014). On his election as president of PAFO last year, he set 
out priorities for African agriculture, including ‘a change of mindset from fighting poverty 
through agriculture, to wealth creation’, and a need for Africa to take ownership of 
opportunities on the continent primarily through intra-Africa trade (PAFO, 2014). This 
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reflects a distinctive neoliberal development ideology being advanced by South African 
farmers. 
 
One of the main ‘success stories’ of South African agribusiness on the continent is that of 
sugar, notably the SA sugar giants, Illovo, and Tongaat Hulett, each with operations in six 
countries in the region and, to a lesser but growing degree, also TSB, now active in three 
countries. The success of these sugar companies builds in large part on the export of a 
model developed and honed over decades in South Africa, of nucleus estates supplemented 
by (indeed, often largely dependent on) contracted outgrowers (Dubb, 2016). The 
adaptation of this model of contract farming, in different ways from Tanzania to Malawi to 
Zambia to Mozambique, shows how these large companies have on the one hand 
reproduced production systems and labour regimes, and the social relations that underpin 
them, while also varying their modalities. At the same time that they have expanded their 
regional footprint, their ownership structures have also changed, with the most significant 
regional player, Illovo, now being 100% owned by Associated British Foods. While 
retaining its South African base of operations, like many others, it is no longer a South 
African company. That sugar is at the ‘frontier’ of expanding industrial farming in the 
region resonates strongly with its important historical role as a frontier crop in the global 
expansion of capitalism (Moore, 2015). 
 
While land deals may constitute processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 
2003), other factors are also changing landholdings. As Jayne, Chamberlin, and 
Headey (2014) have shown, endogenous concentration in landholdings is underway in 
several African countries, driven by local and national elites, and this dynamic, 
including market transactions and local elite land grabs, possibly overshadows 
transnational corporate ‘land grabs’ as a driver of concentration. This suggests that 
domestic capital within African countries is moving up and downstream through food 
value chains. These are highly dynamic contexts into which South African capital, and 
capital routed via South Africa, is expanding. 
 
4.4. Food processing, manufacture, logistics, and distribution 
South African companies are also exporting their food processing, manufacture, logistics, 
and distribution operations, as domestic demand stagnates. Building on the expansion 
of sugar are the four South African food giants – Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, Premier 
Foods, and RCL Foods2 (formerly Rainbow Chicken Limited) – which together dominate 
processing and manufacture in South Africa. These companies are at the epicentre of 
South Africa’s tightly controlled food value chains. In the ‘bread cartel’ scandal of 2009–
2016, the Competition Commission found three of these – Tiger Brands, Pioneer and 
Premier – to have colluded to fix prices by using their collective market power which 
spans milling and baking subsidiaries (Cock, 2009). 
Over the past decade, these companies have regionalized, prompted by dulled growth 
prospects, regulatory constraints and competition at home and by improved prospects in 
regional markets. For instance, faced with domestic competition from cheap Brazilian, 
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EU, and USA chicken imports – the latter being the result of a bilateral trade deal 
between South Africa and the USA in 2016 under the aegis of the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) – RCL Foods was joined by the poultry association in lobbying 
government to conclude government-to-government deals with other countries in the 
region to facilitate the export of South African chicken into neighbouring markets 
(Pitso, 2016). As well as rising market competition at home, another push factor 
driving poultry players into regional markets is the impending introduction of more 
stringent regulations on the maximum level of ‘brining’3 from 30% to 15% – regulations 
not applicable in neighbouring countries (Pitso, 2016). 
 
As a result, the South African poultry industry is rapidly regionalizing. RCL acquired a 
49% in Zam Chick in 2013 for $14.5 million, the year it also acquired FoodCorp, South 
Africa’s third biggest food producer, for $113 million and changed its name from Rainbow 
Chicken Limited to RCL Foods Limited (IOL, 2013). In 2015, together with Zambeef, the 
majority owner of Zam Chick (Zambia Chicken), it made a $4 million investment in Zam 
Hatch, thereby extending its involvement in Zambia’s poultry value chain from a feedmill 
to laying farms, a hatchery and rearing farms (RCL Foods, 2016b) – thereby achieving a 
rapid degree of vertical integration. RCL discourses reflect this turn to an outward-facing 
business strategy: 
 
RCL Foods has implemented a business model to grow the company and ultimately 
supply high quality, nutritious and affordable food to the entire African continent … we 
have begun to actively expand our reach beyond South African borders by continually 
seeking out and negotiating with prospective new business partners across Africa. 
Through our joint venture partnerships with leading food supply companies in the 
African market, we will branch out into new and exciting avenues which will benefit the 
Group as well as our African associates. (RCL Foods, 2016a) 
 
The experience of the dairy industry offers some cautionary tales. Clover, one of South 
Africa’s largest dairy producers in the domestic market, withdrew in 2013 from a 
supply agreement with Danone, the Italian company with a global footprint, and now 
faces competition from it elsewhere on the continent where Danone has 19 factories and a 
workforce of 10,000 (Peacock, 2016). Clover’s attempts to break into the Nigerian and 
Angolan dairy markets faltered, as ‘logistical and supplychain challenges thwarted 
attempts to build its brands’ in those countries (Peacock, 2016). Its competitor, Danone, 
with deeper pockets for more substantial investment, has in contrast bought controlling 
stakes in major dairy companies in both Nigeria and Kenya, tapping into their existing 
and extensive distribution systems, which include 25,000 ‘pushcart bicycle sellers on the 
streets’ – something which the South African company Clover, by ‘going it alone’, could 
not do (Peacock, 2016). All this suggests some binding constraints faced by South 
African companies attempting to expand in isolation into the agro-food systems of 
other countries on the continent. 
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Tiger Brands, the biggest food manufacturer in South Africa, is operational in 22 
countries in Africa, with a focus on maize value chains. Facing declining profits at 
home, Tiger Brands has in the past decade embarked on aggressive acquisitions in other 
African countries, acquiring Nigerian biscuit manufacturer Deli Foods in 2013, as well as 
a 51% stake in the Ethiopian food and beverage East African Group, and 49% of the food 
and beverage operations of UAC of Nigeria Plc (Africa Business Journal, 2014). But the 
direct acquisition of manufacturing businesses has not fared well, and Tiger Brands has 
withdrawn from this mode of operation, shifting instead to investing in distribution 
networks for its South African processed foods. For example, in 2016 it sold its biggest 
investment in Nigeria after an R1 billion loss, which also led to the axing of its CEO 
(Goko, 2016). Meanwhile, its arch-rival at home, Pioneer Foods, has also been 
expanding its Africa operations, having acquired a majority stake in Food Concepts 
PLC, its Nigerian rival in the fast food and bakery sector, and focusing on further 
expansion of operations in Angola, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Ghana. Pioneer has 
extended its footprint through vertical integration combined with regional expansion, 
into grains, animal feed, poultry, and beverages – until recently through a licensing 
agreement with PepsiCo (Pioneer Foods, 2014). 
 
A feature of regional expansion by South African companies is that they co-expand. 
There are several examples of the regionalization of existing business partnerships. For 
instance, Unitrans provides transport and logistics services for Illovo sugar estates and 
to its outgrowers in South Africa, and now also at its operations in Malawi, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania (Smalley, Sulle, & Malale, 2014). Unitrans now operates in 
10 countries in Southern Africa, providing logistics, leasing of on-farm machinery, 
storage, transport, and supply-chain management services, often in partnership with 
South African-based companies, including Tiger Brands and RCL Foods (Unitrans, 
2017).4 This shows how South African companies moving into the region tend to pull 
their value chains with them, often in the context of long-established commercial 
relationships forged inside South Africa, and sometimes in the absence of equivalent 
service industries in host countries. Unitrans is a wholly owned subsidiary of KAP, 
Industrial, established in 2003 as ‘a diversified industrial business focused on growth 
in African markets’ and which acquired Unitrans sometime after 2004.5 In this way, 
Unitrans, first established in 1962, became part of a larger conglomerate of companies 
focused on complementary service provision to manage regional logistics and supply 
chains. All this shows how business networks shape regional expansion, and how South 
African companies with histories of partnership rely on one another, effectively pulling 
their value chains with them as they venture into new territory. 
 
4.5. Supermarkets and fast food 
At the retail end of the value chain, South African supermarkets and fast food chains 
are rapidly expanding their reach, aiming to cash in on both the growing ‘middle class’ 
market in African cities and the growing low-end market for cheap manufactured foods. 
Four giant South African supermarket chains – Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Spar and 
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Woolworths – have all developed a regional imprint over the past two decades. Shoprite, 
‘arguably the most successful supermarket chain in sub-Saharan Africa’, is at the 
forefront, with 320 supermarkets (both corporate and franchise) in 14 African 
countries, and with rapid expansion both within and beyond these countries (Harding, 
2011). Sensitive to criticisms of South African companies bypassing local producers, 
Shoprite has established programmes to assist producers of fresh fruit and vegetables to 
meet its quantity and quality requirements, and so to indigenize its procurement 
practices in its other African operations (Shoprite Holdings Limited, 2016). Yet, it was 
still importing 98% of its retailed fresh fruit and vegetables from South Africa; the 
same proportion of 98% of manufactured food sold in Namibia is imported from 
South Africa (Emongor, 2008). By 2014, Shoprite CEO Whitey Basson’s message to 
his shareholders was summed up as: ‘Don’t bother looking at South Africa — Africa is 
where the really profitable action is’ (Shevel, 2014). Citing the growing middle classes in 
African capital cities, and their desire for big brands and access to a greater variety of 
manufactured and processed foods, he cautioned his own investors to ‘ignore the 
potential of Africa’s shoppers at their peril’ (Shevel, 2014). Clustering its food retail 
(Shoprite, Checkers, Checkers Hyper, USave, OK Foods, and OK Grocer) together with 
fast food (Hungry Lion), liquor (OK Liquor, Friendly Liquor) and its furniture (OK 
Furniture, OK Furniture Dreams, and House & Home) and pharmacy retail brands 
(Shoprite MediRite) (Shoprite Holdings Limited, 2016). 
 
Far behind Shoprite is Pick n Pay, with its Zimbabwean subsidiary TM, which has been 
expanding in Zambia and Ghana, preparing to move into Nigeria, while closing 
operations in Mozambique and Mauritius. Food Lovers’ Market has also expanded from 
South Africa northwards into Zimbabwe. Less significant but still present in food retail 
across several African countries are Spar and Woolworths. High-end chain Woolworths 
opened three stores in Nigeria in 2012, closing all by 2014 (Goko, 2016). By 2016, 
though, Pick n Pay was aiming to expand into Nigeria, this time in a 51– 49% 
partnership with a listed Nigerian company, and initially opening a range of 10 large 
and small format stores (Goko, 2016).  
 
Of more concern to Shoprite than its South African competitors is the Kenyan 
supermarket chain Nakumatt, and Walmart (Harding, 2011) and, to a lesser degree 
perhaps, Botswana’s own supermarket chain Choppies, now also in South Africa and 
elsewhere. Kenya’s Nakumatt supermarket chain now has 35 retail outlets, spanning 
Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania, taking over Shoprite’s flagship Dar Es Salaam 
outlet in 2014, and aiming to expand to Burundi ‘to ensure that we fully cover East 
Africa before setting off on the Nakumatt 2.0 journey, which involves registering a 
Pan-African presence’ with the next steps being supermarket expansion in Nigeria, 
DRC, South Sudan, Malawi, and Botswana, said managing director of Nakumatt 
Holdings, Atul Shah (Harding, 2011). 
 
Also on the move is a fifth supermarket giant in South Africa, Massmart, which had 
existing outlets in 11 countries in Africa (Massmart, 2012) prior to US supermarket giant 
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Walmart’s contentious purchase of it in 2010. This acquisition was contested by the 
national trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions but 
approved by the Competition Commission. As a result, Walmart, via Massmart, has 
expanded its African footprint through its new holdings in the food wholesale and retail 
sectors through its subsidiaries Game and CBW, both of which had existing outlets in 
several countries. Since this purchase, Massmart has moved into more direct competition 
with other South African food retailers in West Africa, including Shoprite which already 
has 16 stores in Nigeria and which, by diversifying its supply chains, now procures 76% of 
food items from local suppliers and farmers (‘Diyan, 2016). Massmart is competing for 
the same market, while also opening smaller grocery stores aimed at Nigeria’s vast low-
income market. Rather than eyeing competition from local retailers, or investors from 
elsewhere, Massmart identifies other South African retailers as its primary competitors: 
‘Shoprite was first and we’re second but with the power of Walmart we hope to overtake 
them’ (Grant Pattison, CEO Massmart, cited in Ventures Africa, 2014). 
 
As South African, Kenyan and other supermarkets expand, first into national capitals 
and then into smaller towns, procurement practices and quality and quantity 
requirements limit access by local smallholders into formal food retail chains 
(Weatherspoon, Neven, Katjiuongua, Fotsin, & Reardon, 2004). Such negative impacts 
reflect the broader contradictions between corporate food retail and more socially 
embedded food trade networks, and the tendency of the former to displace the latter 
(Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003). This is another way in which South African agro-food 
capital is exporting its contradictions and tendency to exclude small-scale farmers and 
rely on large-scale procurement of inputs, large-scale farming, large-scale processing and 
manufacture, and large-scale retail.) 
 
5. Understanding the conditions for failure 
Despite the far-reaching expansion, success for South Africa as a (potential) regional 
hegemon in Africa’s agro-food system is far from assured. Rather, we see diverse cases 
of success and failure by individual companies. This is why we find it instructive to look 
not only at where South African capital has succeeded – in cases lauded on the popular 
South African business website ‘How we made it in Africa’ – but also to understand the 
reasons for its failures. 
 
Several significant examples of failure suggest a range of reasons, including competition 
from domestic agro-food capital; competition from regional actors from other middle-
income countries; and supply-chain difficulties including input and output markets. 
Among the ‘failures’ perhaps the most notable is Tiger Brands’ purchase in 2012 of a 
majority (65.7%) shareholding in Nigeria’s Dangote Flour Mill, an investment which lost 
nearly a quarter of its market value in the year 2013–2014 before Tiger Brands pulled out. 
Second, also in Nigeria, is the demise of the Woolworths retail venture, which foundered 
on supply-chain problems and high pricing of its clothing lines, unlike its competitor 
Shoprite which, through South African-Nigerian joint ventures, managed to get anchor 
positions in 10 new malls at the time of the demise of Woolworths Nigeria (Douglas, 
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2014). Third, Pioneer, too, divested its unprofitable subsidiary Quantum Foods, which 
owns the milling and food manufacture companies Bokomo Uganda and Bokomo 
Zambia. Fourth, after an initial expansion into Tanzania, all three of Shoprite’s stores in 
the country, in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, were bought out by Nakumatt for $45.5million 
in 2014 (Ciuri, 2014; Who Owns Whom, 2017b). Fifth, several farmland investments 
have dwindled from ambitious initial plans to a modest scale of farming. For instance, 
in Congo, a decline from a plan of 10 million hectares, to agreement on 200,000 ha, to 
initial allocation of 80,000 ha, only a fraction of which has been cultivated, and with 
massive attrition of initial investors, with most returning home (Hall et al., 2015), echoing 
the experience of white Zimbabwean farmers who moved into Mozambique after fast-
track land reform (Hammar, 2010). 
 
We hypothesize that one reason for failures such as these is the fact that not all elements 
of the system – which have been combined to create South Africa’s corporate agro-food 
system – are present in new destination markets. The export of some elements of this 
model into countries where states have neither the capacity nor the willingness to create a 
capitalist farming class through regulation and subsidy in the way that the apartheid 
government did, does not always gain traction, and in practice has foundered on 
numerous occasions. Land deals for primary production depend on the provision of both 
infrastructure and political support to facilitate the movement of big capital through 
the agro-food system, as the South African state provided for several decades. The absence 
of such conditions makes corporate investments vulnerable to conditions that differ 
considerably from those that enabled accumulation at home. Capital is thus vulnerable to 
a degree, suffering setbacks and losses in the face of an absence of the conditions that 
enabled the development of a capitalist agro-food system in South Africa in the twentieth 
century. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This article explores the expanding role of forms of agrarian capital based in one of the 
BRICS countries, South Africa, in agro-food systems in Africa more widely. We have 
noted the ways in which the structure of the South African economy has both conditioned 
and precipitated this process of regionalization. We have argued that there are a number 
of significant ‘push’ factors, including stagnating domestic demand in the context of 
massive, structural unemployment, with capital driven to seek new markets for products. 
Against this backdrop, we argue that the end of apartheid and the increased degree of 
integration into the global economy that this entailed came at a good time for South 
African capital. Here we concur with Bernstein (2013, p. 23) who notes ‘the importance 
of the removal of the limits on international mobility of capital and commodities imposed 
by the apartheid regime’ and the ways in which these policies, and their timing, have 
enabled South African agribusinesses to reposition themselves in the era of deregulation 
and liberalization. 
 
However, capital moving from and via South Africa into other Africa countries has also 
encountered substantial obstacles to entry, and been challenged by severe competition 
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from other companies in its destination markets. These companies are located both in and 
from other middle-income countries with expanding agro-food industries of their own. 
While a ‘first-mover advantage’ may have buoyed South African corporate investors in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, since then their expansion has been more chequered, 
and seen several notable failures as well as some successes. The ambitions of giant 
South African agribusinesses to become regional hegemons are thus often thwarted. 
 
Apartheid policies from the 1940s onwards established the conditions for the emergence of 
a particular form of agrarian capital, corporate agribusiness, in which an authoritarian 
state was able to enforce low levels of subsistence while simultaneously increasing the 
productivity and output of capitalist agriculture through subsidies made possible by funds 
from a lucrative mining sector. In other African countries, given their different histories 
and circumstances, these conditions rarely exist. 
 
South African corporate investment in countries across the continent – in the food 
system, but also in mining, telecommunications, finance, construction, transport, and 
logistics – often involves companies retaining their South African base. But, as the 
example of major brewer SABMiller illustrates, many companies are ‘transnationalizing’, 
rebranding themselves for an African market, while providing a route through which 
global capital can partner with South African capital in its expansion strategies. As the 
examples of the Chinese stake in Standard Bank and the purchase of Illovo Sugar by 
Associated British Food plc show, the notion of ‘South African capital’ is becoming 
increasingly moot. 
 
Understanding the links between internal and regional agro-food transformations 
requires that we examine both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors conditioning the behaviour of 
capital, as well as the impacts of the entry of South African companies. These are the core of 
an agenda for future research. The key questions can be posed as follows: first, which 
actors in agro-food value chains are the key drivers of regional expansion – for instance, is 
this primarily a production-, processing-, or retail-led dynamic? Second, what are the 
conditions that make exporting elements of the South African agro-food system feasible or 
unfeasible, and influence the outcomes of such investments – in other words, what 
explains the variable track record, and outcomes of ‘success’ and ‘failure’, and for 
whom? Third, how do ‘host states’ position themselves in soliciting inward investment 
while also aiming to support local ownership of core farming, processing, and retail 
companies, and how does the character of the local political economy shape the terms on 
which outsiders – South Africans and others – are allowed to enter into Africa’s agro-
food system? Fourth, where is the South African state in all this? How is the state 
positioned with respect to agribusiness and related capital, South African and 
multinational, in an era of deregulated commodity and financial markets? 
 
In this article we have argued that South African agrarian capital’s engagement elsewhere 
on the continent exhibits a degree of path-dependency, reflecting its domestic 
accumulation path and its socially and politically contradictory focus on benefiting a 
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narrow (racially defined) elite. However, the ways in which this plays out in practice are 
highly contingent, as capital encounters different conditions and new competitors. What 
is under way is the export of elements of South Africa’s agro- food system into countries 
where states lack either the capacity or the willingness (or both) to create a small, elite 
class of capitalist farmers, through regulation and subsidy, in the way that the apartheid 
government did. It is for this reason that, despite the narrative of ‘Africa rising’ and the 
allure of growing markets, South African capital suffers not from only competition but 
also severe setbacks, often due to the starkly different conditions into which elements of 
South Africa’s agro-food system are inserted. Export of this system is thus built on shaky 
foundations. 
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Notes 
1. Standard Bank now also operates in Angola, Botswana, Congo, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. But through acquisitions it has also extended 
beyond Africa to the Americas (Brazil, Argentina, and the USA) and to China, Hong 
Kong, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 
and United Kingdom. 
2. RCL Foods, formerly Rainbow Chickens Limited, changed its name in 2013 to reflect 
its wider spectrum of brands, and is majority owned by Remgrow. 
3. Brining is the injection of brine – salty water – into the chicken, ostensibly to 
retain succulence and improve flavour, thereby increasing weight without 
commensurate nutritional benefit. 
4. http://www.unitrans.co.za/customers 
5. http://www.unitrans.co.za/about http://www.kap.co.za/about/our-history/ 
http://www.kap.co.za/ – but contradicted  by  this:  
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACT/2005/9.pdf  about  Steinhoff  and  forestry 
expansion. 
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